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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UT A H , / 
Plaintiff/Respondent / 
vs / CaseNo20010462-CA 
KELLY GARNER / judge 
Defendant/Appellant / Priority No 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from a conditional plea of guilty before the Honorable Parley 
R. Baldwin of four counts of burglary, in violation of Section 76-6-202 U. C. A. all 
third degree felonies. 
The basis of the Defendant's appeal is that the Defendant was denied the 
right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
STATE OF UTAH V GARNER 
Case Number 20010462-CA 
This denial of the right to a speedy trial was caused by the State's failure to file a 
timely detainer.. On April 19, 2 0 0 1 , the Defendant pled guilty on a conditional 
plea to the four burglary charges, and the Trial Court accepted the plea and 
reserved the Defendant's right to appeal its decision on the denial of Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress and Dismiss. The Defendant was sentenced on May 10, 2001 
to serve an indeterminate term of zero to five years in the Utah State prison on 
each of the four felonies. These terms were ordered to be served concurrently and 
to run concurrently with the case pending in Alabama.. 
The notice of appeal was filed with the Court on the 24th Day of May, 
2 0 0 1 . The Jurisdiction of this Court is conferred pursuant to U.C.A. Sec 78-2a-3 
Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the Court commit reversible error when it ruled that 
statements of the Defendant and evidence obtained by a 
search of the Defendant would not be suppressed? 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW 
The factual finding underlying a trial court's decision to deny a motion to 
suppress evidence are reviewed under the deferential clearly-erroneous standard, 
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and the legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a measure of discretion 
given to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts. State v. 
O'Brien. 959 P 2nd 647,648 (Utah App 1998), State v. Truiillo 2001 UT App 
147 (Utah App 2001) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged by information with four counts of burglary in 
violation of Section 76-6-202 UCA, third degree felonies, three counts of theft in 
violation of Section 76-6-404 UCA , second degree felonies, two counts of 
criminal mischief in violation of Section 76-6-106 UCA, second degree felonies 
and one count of theft, a Class B misdemeanor in violation of Section 76-6-404UC 
A. On January 4, 2001 the Defendant waived a preliminary hearing and entered 
pleas of not guilty. 
On January 25, 2001 the Defendant through his appointed counsel 
informed the Court that he would file a motion to dismiss the informations on the 
speedy trial grounds. The Court heard the Defendant's motion to dismiss on 
February 22 , 2 0 0 1 . The basis of the motion was that the State obtained a full and 
complete statement of the co-defendant on May 5, 1998 and that the informations 
against the Defendant were not filed until June, 1999. During the one year plus 
2 
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period the State had an opportunity to talk to the Defendant, but did not contact 
the Defendant. In the meantime the defendant's mother died and the Defendant 
alleges that she would have provided an alibi for the Defendant at the times of the 
alleged offenses. 
The Defendant argued that because his mother, who would testify in his 
behalf died during the delay this was actual prejudice, and because the Defendant 
had not been charged, he could not invoke his right to a speedy trial. Further, to 
prove negligence on the part of the State, it knew that the Defendant was in prison 
in Colorado, and yet did not file a detainer. Then the Defendant went to prison in 
Alabama, and when he was ready to get paroled only then the State filed in 
Alabama a detainer against the Defendant. 
On March 22, 2001 the Court ruled that the Defendant's case does not fall 
into the category of violation of speedy trial and therefore, the Court denied the 
motion. On April 19, 2001 the Defendant pled guilty to four counts of burglary, 
third degree felonies, and all other counts will be dismissed. In making the plea, the 
Defendant reserved his right to appeal the Court's denial of his motion to suppress 
the evidence. 
3 
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FACTS 
By information, the Defendant was charged with four counts of burglary, in 
violation of Section 76-6-202 UCA, third degree felonies, three counts of theft in 
violation of Section 76-6-404 UCA, second degree felonies, two counts of criminal 
mischief, in violation of Section 76-6-106 UCA, third degree felonies and one 
count of theft in violation of Section 76-6-404 UCA, a class B misdemeanor. ( T 
December 22 , 2000 Hearing pg's 1 -2) At that hearing the Weber County Public 
Defenders Association entered as counsel for the Defendant. ( T. December 22, 
2000 Hearing, p. Z) 
The Defendant waived his right to a preliminary hearing on January 4, 2001 
and the Defendant entered pleas of not guilty to all counts. ( T. January 4, 2001 
Hearing pg's 1 -3) The next hearing was held on January 25, 2001 at which 
hearing counsel for the Defendant moved to strike the trial date as he was filing a 
Motion to Dismiss based on speedy trial grounds. ( T January 25, 2001 Hearing, 
P. D 
A hearing was held on the Defendant's motion to dismiss on February 22, 
2 0 0 1 . At that hearing counsel for the Defendant argued that on May 5, 1998 the 
State obtained a full, fairly complete statement from the alleged co-defendant, 
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which was basically the main evidence against the Defendant. The State delayed 
filing the informations until June, 1999 (February 22, 2001 Hearing p. 1) During 
the period of May, 1998 to June, 1999 the Defendant's mother died and the 
Defendant alleges that she would have been able to provide the Defendant with an 
alibi. The Defendant claims his mother would have testified that couldn't have 
done these crimes because he was visiting with her and that he was never out late at 
night when the crimes occurred. ( T. February 22, 2001 Hearing pg's 1 -2) 
Based on the mother's alleged testimony the delay was an actual prejudice to 
the Defendant's defense. Counsel for the Defendant then argued that under the 
United States Supreme Court decision in the case of Dogget v United States 505 
U.S. 647, 120 L Ed 2nd 520, 112 S. Ct 2686 (1992) that there was a sufficient 
violation of his rights. This case held in pre 1980 cases the Court's required the 
Defendant to show actual prejudice to prevail on a due process claim, whereas now 
the Court held that delay itself was sufficient to violate the due process clause.. As 
for a speedy trial you now to prevail do not have to show that the State 
intentionally delayed the trial to get gain. ( T. February 22, 2001 Hearing p. 2) 
Counsel for the Defendant argued that the State knew everything they 
needed approximately a year plus before they filed. This delay constituted both 
5 
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negligence and actual prejudice to the Defendant because he could not invoke his 
right to a speedy trial until the State filed informations against him. Further, as soon 
as the Defendant received copies of the informations, he filed his 180 day 
disposition on detainers, and then the State waited another three months before 
they actually returned the Defendant to Utah. The State never offered an excuse as 
to why they didn't file a detainer. ( T. February 22, 2001 Hearing pg's. 4-5) The 
Defendant closed his argument by submitting that the State denied Mr. Garner his 
right to a speedy trial and also submitted that they denied him his right to due 
process on the pre-indictment delay. ( T. February 22, 2001 Hearing p. 6) 
The State countered the argument by the Defendant by stating that the 
public prosecutor is not compelled to file charges as soon as there is probable cause 
to do so. Further, the State was aware that the Defendant was incarcerated in 
Colorado and was investigating what was necessary to return him to Utah. (T. 
February 22, 2001 Hearing pg's 6-7) The State then argued that it was not an 
egregious period of time between the commencement of the investigation in May of 
'98 and the filing of the information in May of '99. The State claimed that the 
death of the Defendant's witness would not have made any difference because the 
witness was already deceased. (T February 22 2001 Hearing pg's 7-9) The State 
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conceded that the delay in filing a detainer between ]une of 1999 and August, 
2000 was simply negligence, dereliction, and whatever. ( T. February 22, 2001 
Hearing p. 9) 
Counsel for the Defendant attempted to distinguish this case from Dogget. In 
that case the Government did not know where the Defendant was. In this case the 
State knew at all times where the Defendant was incarcerated. (T. February 22, 
2001 Hearing p. 19) 
On March 22,2001 the Court ruled that under the Beman case that dockets 
can cause delays. Therefore, the Judge ruled that this case does not fall into the 
category of violation of speedy trial and therefore the Judge denied the motion. ( 
T. March 22, 2001 Hearing pg's 1-2) Both the State and the Defendant stipulated 
that there was approximately a twenty month delay in this case. ( T. March 22, 
2001 Hearing p. 4) 
On April 19, 2001 the Defendant in open court pled guilty to four counts 
of burglary, and the State agreed to dismiss the remaining six counts. The 
Defendant reserved the right to appeal the Court's denial of the Defendant's motion 
to dismiss based on the speedy trial issue. (T. April 19, 2001 Hearing pg's 1 -3, 5) 
At a May 10, 2001 Hearing the Court sentenced the Defendant to serve four 
7 
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concurrent terms at the Utah State Prison, to run concurrent with the sentence the 
Defendant Is serving In Alabama. (T. May 10, 2001 Hearing pg's 1 -2) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court committed reversible error when it denied the Defendant's 
motion to dismiss based on the fact that the State denied the Defendant due 
process of law and the right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Sixth and 
Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7, 
of the Utah Constitution. It failed to file informations and detainers for some 
twenty months after the events occurred, where at all times the State knew where 
the Defendant was housed. 
POINT I 
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR WHEN IT REFUSED TO DISMISS 
THE CHARGES AGAINST THE 
DEFENDANT BECAUSE THE 
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE RIGHT 
TO A SPEEDY TRIAL AS GUARANTEED 
BY THE SIXTH AND FOURTEEN 
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
Amendment VI of the United States Constitution provides as follows: 
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"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of 
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of counsel for his defense." 
Amendment XIV, Part 1 of the United States Constitution provides as 
follows: 
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and the State wherein they reside. No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the law." 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides as follows: 
" No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law." 
The United States Supreme Court in the case of Doggett v United States 
505 US 647, 120 L. Ed 2d 520, 112 S Ct. 2686 (1992) considered the issue of 
when a violation of the Defendant's right to a speedy trial caused a dismissal of the 
charges. In the Doggett case the Defendant was indicted on federal drug charges in 
9 
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February, 1990. The DEA determined that the Defendant was imprisoned in 
Panama and therefore requested that he be expelled back to the United States. 
Once the DEA determined that the Defendant left Panama for Columbia it made 
no further attempt to locate him. In 1992 the Defendant reentered the United 
States, earned a college degree, found employment and lived openly under his own 
name. In 1988, while doing a simple check on outstanding warrants the U. S. 
Marshall's service located the Defendant and arrested him in 1988. 
Upon arrest the Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing the 
Government's failure to prosecute him earlier violated his Sixth Amendment right 
to a speedy trial. The Magistrate found the delay between Doggett's indictment 
and arrest was long enough to be "presumptively prejudicial," that the delay was 
"clearly [was] attributable to the negligence of the government, that Doggett would 
not be faulted for any delay in asserting his right to a speedy trial, there being no 
evidence that he had known of the charges against him until his arrest. The 
Magistrate also found, however, that Dogget had made no affirmative showing that 
the delay impaired his ability to mount a successful defense or had otherwise 
prejudiced him. The Trial Court based this on the recommendation of the 
Magistrate who denied Doggett's motion. Doggett then entered a conditional guilty 
plea under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (a)(2), expressly reserving the 
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right to appeal his ensuing conviction on the speedy trial claim. A spit panel of the 
Court of Appeals affirmed. 
The Supreme Court held that Court's had limited the broad sweep of the 
Sixth Amendment by specifically recognizing the relevance of four separate 
enquiries: whether delay before trial was uncommonly long, whether the 
government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for the delay, whether, in 
due course, the Defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and whether he 
suffered prejudice as the delay's result. Barker, supra 33 L Ed 2nd 101, 92 S Ct 
218 The Court expressly held that the Defendant need not invoke his speedy trial 
right until after his arrest. Doggett, supra at 529. 
The Court then considered that the Defendant must show affirmatively how 
he was prejudiced by the delay between his indictment and trial. The Court stated 
at 529-530, supra that it had observed in prior cases that unreasonable delay 
between formal accusation and trial threatens to produce more than one sort of 
harm, including "oppressive pretrial incarceration," "anxiety and concern of the 
accused," and "the possibility that the [accused's] defenses will be impaired" by 
dimming memories and loss of exculpatory evidence. Of these forms of prejudice 
"the most serious is the last" because of the inability of a defendant adequately to 
prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system." The government argued 
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the proposition that the Speedy Trial Clause does not significantly protect a criminal 
defendant's interest in fair adjudication. In so arguing, the Government asks us, in 
effect, to read part of Barker right out of law, and that we will not do. 
The Court concluded that it recognized that excessive delay presumptively 
compromised the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for 
that matter, identify. The Court, in reversing Doggett conditional plea stated the 
condoning of prolonged and unjustifiable delays in prosecution would both penalize 
many defendants for the state's fault and simply encourage the government to 
gamble with the interests of criminal suspects assigned a low prosecutorial priority. 
This Court in the case of State v. Russell 2000 Ut App 359 (Utah App 
2000) considered the issue of whether an eight month delay was sufficiently 
egregious to trigger the speedy trial right. The Court held that the delay of eight 
months was not egregious, where the delay was caused in large part by the 
Defendant's own acts. The same result was held by this Court in the case of State v 
Lewa 986 P 2d 910 (Utah App. 1995) where the Defendant failed to meet his 
appointment with APscP, and while on probation in Utah was incarcerated in 
another state. The Court held that the Defendant was not prejudiced by the delay 
in sentencing. The Utah Supreme Court in the case of State v. lensen 818 P 2d 
551 (Utah 1991) came to the same conclusion where the Defendant instigated the 
12 
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delay. 
In this case the State basically obtained a full and complete statement from 
the co-defendant on May 5, 1998, that clearly implicated the Defendant in the 
crime. The Statement was some twenty plus pages The State delayed filing the 
information until ]une of 1999. In the meantime the Defendant's mother died. 
The Defendant informed his counsel that had the Defendant's mother been alive in 
June, 1999 she would have testified that the Defendant could not have done these 
crimes because he was there visiting at her house at the times these crimes were 
occurring. ( T. February 22, 2001 Hearing pg's 1-2) 
During the long period the State was able to find the Defendant because he 
was first incarcerated in the Davis County jail, then incarcerated in Colorado and 
lastly in Alabama. At all times prior to the indictment the State, with little effort, 
would have been able to talk to the Defendant. While incarcerated in Alabama the 
State sent a detainer to Alabama. When the Defendant was eligible for parole, 
Alabama refused to consider his parole because of the detainer from Utah. 
Even though the United States Supreme Court in Doggett, supra stated there 
was no need to show actual prejudice caused by the delay, the Defendant showed 
actual prejudice in two instances, the death of his mother, a potential alibi witness 
and the failure to obtain a parole in Alabama. The State offered no excuse for the 
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delay in filing the information, and there was no evidence the delay was caused by 
any action of the Defendant. 
Thus under the ruling of Doggett, supra the Defendant, by the actions of the 
State, was denied his right of a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
The actions of the State in delaying the filing of an indictment until ]une of 
1999, where the Defendant showed actual prejudice by the death of his mother in 
the intervening period and the failure of his obtaining parole in Alabama by reason 
of the State filing a detainer with Alabama, deprived the Defendant of the right to a 
speedy trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. The Trial Judge 
committed committed reversible error when he ruled that the actions of the State 
did not trigger the Speedy Trial rights. 
DATED this^th of November, 2001 
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ADDENDUM 
1 OGDEN, UTAH - DECEMBER 22, 2000 
2 ROGER S. DUTSON PRESIDING 
3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 COURT CLERK: The State of Utah vs. Kelly Lafe 
5 Garner, case number 991902255. Is Kelly Lafe Garner your true 
6 and correct name? 
7 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
8 COURT CLERK: Count 1 reads on or about the 2 6th day 
9 I of March, 1998, in Weber County State of Utah, you've been 
10 | charged with committing a third degree felony to wit burglary. 
11 Do I need to read the body? 
12 THE COURT: No. 
13 COURT CLERK: Okay. Count 2 reads on or about the 
14 26th day of March 1998, in Weber County, State of Utah, you've 
15 been charged with committing a second degree felony to wit: 
16 theft. Count 3 reads on or about the 26th day of March 1998, 
17 in Weber County, State of Utah, you've been charged with 
18 committing a third degree felony to wit: criminal mischief. 
19 Count 4 reads on or about the 19th day of February 1998, in 
20 Weber County, State of Utah, you've been charged with 
21 committing a third degree felony to wit: burglary. Count 5 
22 reads on or about the 19th day of February 1998, in Weber 
23 County, State of Utah, you've been charged with committing a 
24 second degree felony to wit: theft. Count 6 reads on or 
25 between November 20, 1997, and November 21, 1997, in Weber 
1 County, State of Utah, you've been charged with committing a 
2 third degree felony to wit: burglary. Count 7 reads on or 
3 between November 20, 1997, and November 21, 1997, in Weber 
4 County, State of Utah, you've been charged with committing a 
5 second degree felony to wit: theft. Count 8 reads on or about 
6 the 28th day of November, 1997, in Weber County, State of Utah, 
7 you've been charged with committing a third degree felony to 
8 wit: burglary. Count 9 reads on or about the 28th day of 
9 November, 1997, in Weber County, State of Utah, you've been 
10 charged with committing a third degree felony to wit: criminal 
11 mischief. Count 10 reads on or about the 28*"^  day of November, 
12 1997, in Weber County, State of Utah, you've been charged with 
13 committing a Class B Misdemeanor to wit: theft. 
14 THE COURT: All right. These third degree felonies 
15 I each carry a - do you waive further reading of the information? 
16 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
17 I THE COURT: The third degree felonies carry a maximum 
18 penalties of zero to five years in prison, up to a $5,000 fine 
19 on each, and the second degree felonies each carry maximum 
20 penalties of one to fifteen years in prison, up to a $10,000 
21 fine on each and the Class B Misdemeanor carries a maximum 
22 penalty of up to six months in jail and a $1,000 fine and the 
23 misdemeanor will follow the felonies. OYou can hire your own 
24 attorney or if you are indigent, the public defender would be 
25 appointed to represent you, if you want the public defender to 
1 represent you. You have the right to have a preliminary 
2 hearing and if, after that hearing, the Court finds there is 
3 probable cause to believe you committed each of the offenses, 
4 then you would be required, each or any of the offenses, then 
5 you'd be required to enter a plea of either guilty, no contest, 
6 or not guilty and have a speedy and public jury trial. The 
7 bail has presently been set at $60,500 which would be the 
8 standard bail for this type of offense. Did you wish to 
9 discuss bail any further? 
10 MR. WEISKOPF: Your Honor, he's felony on felony. 
11 THE COURT: It's felony on felony so there would be 
12 no bail available. 
13 And are you going to enter as counsel? 
14 MR. MARSHALL: I'll defend it, yes, your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: All right. Do you want the public 
16 defender to represent you in these matters, Mr. Garner? 
17 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
18 THE COURT: All right. We'll set them for 
19 preliminary hearing. 
20 COURT CLERK: We can set this January 2 at 2:00 with 
21 Judge Heffernan. 
22 MR. MARSHALL: Your Honor, if view of the holidays 
23 and the numerous counts, (inaudible). 
24 THE COURT: What date? January 2nd? 
25 COURT CLERK: That's a week from today. 
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4 THE COURT: Go to number 21, Kelly Garner. 
5 COURT CLERK: The State of Utah versus Kelly Garner, 
6 991902255. This is the time set for a Preliminary Hearing. 
7 MR. GRAVIS: Mr. Garner is here, your Honor. This is 
8 the time set for a preliminary hearing. This will be a waiver 
9 to plead not guilty. 
10 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Garner, you understand on 
11 these felony matters that you have a right to a preliminary 
12 hearing. The purpose of the preliminary hearing is to 
13 determine whether or not there is not a finding of guilt or 
14 innocense, it's a determination if there is probable cause that 
15 the crimes were committed and committed by you. If you waive 
16 that preliminary hearing, the Court will have you arraigned. 
17 You can then plead not guilty and we'll set the matter for 
18 trial. Okay? Is it your desire now to waive your preliminary 
19 hearing, sir? 
20 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir. 
21 THE COURT: The Court will accept the waiver and find 
22 that there is probable cause. I'll ask the clerk to arraign 
23 you. 
24 COURT CLERK: Is Kelly Garner your true and correct 
25 name? 
1 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is. 
2 I COURT CLERK: Count 1, you have been charged on or 
3 about the 26th day of March, 1998, in Weber County, State of 
4 Utah, with committing a third degree felony of burglary. Said 
5 defendant entered and remained unlawfully in a building or in a 
6 portion of a building at 860 West Riverdale Road, Number Dl, 
7 with intent to commit a theft, a felony or commit an assault on 
8 any person. Count 2, you have been charged on or about the 
9 26th day of March, 1998, with a second degree felony which is 
10 theft. Said defendant obtained or exercised unauthorized 
11 control of property at (inaudible) Pharmacy to wit: 
12 pharmaceuticals of a value exceeding $5,000 with the purpose to 
13 deprive the owner thereof. Count 3, you have been charged on 
14 or about the 26th day of March, 1998, with a third degree 
15 J felony to wit: criminal mischief. Said defendant intentionally 
16 J damaged, defaced or destroyed the property of Senior Pharmacy, 
17 I to wit: damage to alarm, locks, doors, and windows and caused 
18 or intended to cause pecuniary loss of $1,000 or more but less 
19 than $5,000. Count 4, you have been charged on or about the 
20 19th day of February -
21 MR. GRAVIS: We'll waive the formal reading, Count 4 
22 to reads the same as Count 1 except for the address and the 
23 date. 
24 THE COURT: Yes, the building at 3795 Kiesel. Count 
25 5. 
1 \ MR. GRAVIS: Reads the same as Count 2 except for -
2 THE COURT: Except it's (inaudible) Pharmacy and it's 
3 pharmaceuticals and cash. Count 6 is a third degree felony 
4 I burglary. The address is at 1491 Ridgeline Drive. Count 7 is 
5 a second degree theft. Property of First Security Mortgage to 
6 wit: office equipment, computers, and (inaudible). Count 8 is 
7 a third degree felony burglary. The building is located at 
8 J 1770 Komby Road. Nine, is a third degree felony criminal 
9 I mischief. The property was Great Basin Dental and it was 
10 I damage to doors, windows and telephone junction box. Count 10 
11 I is a Class B misdemeanor theft. 
12 I THE COURT: To those counts how do you plead, Mr. 
13 I Garner? 
14 THE DEFENDANT: Not guilty. 
15 ! THE COURT: The Court will accept the plea of not 
16 guilty and will set the matter for trial. How much time? 
17 MR. PARMLEY: It appears to be at least a three day 
18 trial. The Court should also be aware, your Honor, that the 
19 defendant has been extradited, I believe from Arkansas 
20 MR. GRAVIS: Alabama. 
21 MR. PARMLEY: Or Alabama, and there is a notice and a 
22 request for disposition of informations that he appears to have 
23 signed September 12. I don't know the date that that was 
24 logged with the court in the State of Utah but from that date, 
25 I believe that there's 180 days for the matter to be brought to 
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4 MR. GRAVIS: Can we got to number 19, Kelly Garner, 
5 your Honor? 
6 THE COURT: I'm sorry, Mr. Gravis? 
7 MR. GRAVIS: Number 19, Kelly Garner. 
8 COURT CLERK: The State of Utah versus Kelly Garner, 
9 991902255. 
10 MR. GRAVIS: Mr. Garner is here, your Honor. This is 
11 set for pretrial. I will be filing tomorrow a Motion to 
12 Dismiss this on speedy trial grounds. As Mr. Parmley is aware, 
13 I'm filing the motion and we're asking the Court to strike the 
14 trial and reset it within 180 days, so we hope that the motion 
15 is depositive but we want a backup trial date just in case. 
16 I THE COURT: Now, let me see if I understand you 
17 I correctly. You want me to strike the trial? 
18 MR. GRAVIS: Yes. Our motion is not on 180 day 
19 disposition. It's on the right to a speedy trial under the 
20 Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Basically 
21 our argument is is that the State has violated that even before 
22 they placed the detainer on him. 
23 MR. PARMLEY: I was aware that Mr. Gravis was 
24 preparing this motion that he's talking about. We also talked 
25 about how realistic it was to leave this trial date in place 
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4 I THE COURT: This is a motion to dismiss. The motion 
5 is based upon the issues of a speedy trial which is the 
6 Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article 
7 1 of the Constitution of Utah. There have been memorandums 
8 filed in this matter. Mr. Gravis? 
9 MR. GRAVIS: Yes, your Honor. I think there has been 
10 a whole lot of dispute over the facts. I'm not sure if we 
11 necessarily agree that the State would have been in a better 
12 I position to file after talking to defendant. Supposedly, they 
13 could have talk to him. He would have talk to him. But once 
14 they knew that he wasn't in Davis County Jail and did come into 
15 j talk to him they still could have filed substantially before 
16 June of '99 since they basically had a full, a fairly complete 
17 statement from the alleged co-defendant on May 5th of '98, 
18 though she may have added to it over the months. That 
19 statement, I think, Mr. Parmley agreed, says that she did it 
20 with the defendant, went through, it's an extensive, twenty 
21 something, twenty plus pages, handwritten statement she gave on 
22 March 5, I mean May 5th of '98. The State did not file until 
23 June of '99. 
24 In the meantime the defendant's mother died and what 
25 the defendant tells me and that would be an issue of fact is 
whether or not she would be, now he tells me that she would 
testify that he couldn't have done these crimes because he was 
there visiting at her house at the time these crimes were 
occurring; that she would testify that he was never out late 
at night when these crimes occurred. So we submit that as 
actual prejudice. There's a two (inaudible) argument, their 
delay prior, pre-filing delay is a due process argument on the 
Fifth Amendment. We do disagree with the State in that what 
needed to be shown. They've cited some cases, the Tenth 
Circuit cases from the x80fs, Doggett says that the pre-
indictment filing of the x92 cases for the due process you have 
to show absolute prejudice, and the other things are the same 
as for a speedy trial which is the reason for the delay and we 
don't have show that the delay was intentional to gain 
(inaudible) favorable position for the State. We would submit 
that negligence is also available in this case. 
So, there is basically a year delay in filing from the 
time they pretty much knew everything they needed to know to 
file until they filed. Like I say, they knew that the 
defendant was in Davis County Jail. On April 18 he was 
arrested. I'm not sure when exactly they knew we wasn't no 
longer there. He spent approximately thirty days there in 
Davis County. In fact, in May of *99 they knew he was in 
Colorado. They still didn't talk to him then. In x99, when 
they did subsequently file in June of x99. So, that's mine. 
1 did do it when he was in Columbia, the United States Supreme 
2 | Court did hold that against him. 
3 Six years prior to the time he was arrested in the 
4 United States, he comes back, the Government had notified the 
5 Customs Department that if he comes back through customs, you 
6 know, we've got a warrant out for him. But he came back and 
7 I went through Customs, wasn't stopped, got a college degree, 
8 J worked, paid taxes. The Supreme Court says, Hey, if you just 
9 looked for him, he wasn't hiding, you could have found him. 
10 It's negligence. It's six times longer than the presumption of 
11 prejudice. Therefore, he's been denied his right to a speedy 
12 J trial. 
13 In this case, defendant, they knew where he was. 
14 They knew he was in prison in Colorado in May of x99. They 
15 didn't file a detainer. It's not until after he's released 
16 from Colorado a detainer had been filed by Alabama. In Alabama 
17 he's getting ready to be paroled and they say, Hey, wait a 
18 minute. We got a warrant out of Utah. Let's contact them and 
19 see what they want to do. Does the State file a detainer? 
20 They file it in August of 2000. The defendant, upon receiving 
21 notice of the detainer files his 180 day disposition on 
22 detainers and the State still waits another three months before 
23 they actually get him back here. He doesn't show up here in 
24 court until the 22nd of December. So, ninety days of his 120 
25 day disposition has already passed. And they've offered no 
4 
1 excuse for it. Why didn't they, they offered no excuse why 
2 they didn't file a detainer. Doggett says, and I'm quoting: 
3 "When the government's negligence does 
4 cause six times as long as is generally 
5 sufficient to figure judicial review, see 
6 I note 1 supra, and when the presumption of 
7 prejudice, although unspecified is neither 
8 extenuated as by the defendant's 
9 I acquiescence, nor persuasively rebutted, 
10 the defendant is entitled to relief." 
11 So, the State hasn't performed their duty since the 
12 State has not, that has agreed that he did not acquiesced to 
13 the delay, they have an affirmative duty to show so rebut the 
14 presumption of prejudice. I submit that they have offered no 
15 evidence to rebut that. That period of time that one, past one 
16 year when the presumption is attached, the presumption of 
17 prejudice has attached, the State has made no effort to rebut 
18 it, it's their obligation. They have the burden of rebutting 
19 that. They've presented nothing to rebut it. No explanation 
20 as to why they didn't file a retainer while he was in Colorado 
21 and why they didn't check to see what happened to him from May 
22 until - of x98, until August of '90. I mean May of "99 of 
23 August of 2000. It's only when they say, Hey, we're going to 
24 release this guy in November on parole. You've got this 
25 warrant. What do you want us to do? Do they think that they 
5 
1 even get around to filing the detainer. The Supreme Court 
2 talks about when they're negligent they simply say, it must be 
3 that the government is not really that interested in 
4 prosecuting. I submit they're not really that interested. 
5 They've known where, they didn't file when they could have. 
6 Now the State will argue, well, we wanted to further 
7 investigate but once they filed and they know where he's at, 
8 j they have an obligation to do something about it and they 
9 I neglected it. Simply said, Hey, we don't really care. We can 
10 go get him in Colorado. File a detainer, he files a 180 
11 disposition, he's right there. We can bring him back and 
12 resolve the case. They don't do it. They simply let it lay. 
13 He gets moved from Colorado to Alabama. They simply let it lay 
14 until they get notified, you know, if you don't want to do, 
15 I basically, if you don't want to do anything, we're going to let 
16 the guy out. And now they want to do something because he's 
17 going to be out. So, we'd submit that the State has denied Mr. 
18 Garner his right to a speedy trial and we also submit they 
19 denied him his right to due process on the pre-indictment 
20 delay. 
21 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Gravis. 
22 Mr. Parmley? 
23 MR. PARMLEY: Thank you, your Honor. Let me go ahead 
24 and start with the due process part of this argument and that's 
25 delay by the State once they've begun an investigation until 
6 
1 they actually file charges. The defendant's claim is that he 
2 I suffered actual prejudice because of that delay between May of 
3 I 1998 and the filing of the informations in June of 1999 when he 
4 was incarcerated in the Davis County Jail. However, the Court 
5 in Lavosco and Smith, the cases that have been cited, and made 
6 it clear that the public prosecutor is not compelled to file 
7 charges as soon as there is probable cause to do so. This 
8 Court is well aware of the statute in Utah that reads that a 
9 defendant cannot be convicted solely on the testimony of a co-
10 J conspirator which was essentially what this statement was in 
11 May of 1998. They were trying to find corroborating evidence 
12 to that. Also, Detective Ebert - and I have to do this by way 
13 of proffer because he is not here - but he would say that when 
14 the defendant was incarcerated in Davis County, they wanted to 
15 interview him there. It was very, very shortly after that that 
16 he was gone. And, in fact, they didn't know where he had gone 
17 but he was completely gone from the jurisdiction of the State 
18 of Utah as far as we could tell and Detective Ebert simply 
19 continued his investigation to the extent that he could, 
20 continuing into 1999 and Mr. Gravis is correct that in May of 
21 1999, and I shared this information with Mr. Gravis, we have a 
22 note on our information approval for these charges saying 
23 defendant is apparently incarcerated in prison in Colorado. 
24 See what we need to do to bring him back. That was made by Ms. 
25 Neider in May of June of 1999. 
1 So, I think that knowledge that he was incarcerated 
2 in prison in Colorado has to be attributed to the State at that 
3 point. I don't think there is any question about that. But 
4 the reality is that this is not an egregious length of time for 
5 an investigation to have been ongoing, number one, but number 
6 two, the claim of actual prejudice that the defendant's mother 
7 is no longer available because of her death is really somewhat 
8 moot because she died in May of '97 and the very earliest - or 
9 May of '98, I'm sorry. 
10 MR. PARMLEY: May of '98. 
11 MR. GRAVIS: May of '98, and that's what I meant to 
12 say. The very earliest the State could have even considered 
13 I filing this was when they obtained the initial statement of the 
14 co-conspirator in May of '98. And I think that Mr. Gravis will 
15 I concede that there were additional interviews after that time 
16 I and Detective Ebert - and this is a common practice to wait and 
17 try to talk with the suspect before we jump in and file 
18 charges. And that's partly because we want to get the other 
19 side of the story before we necessarily jump to conclusions 
20 that everything we understand from the other witnesses we've 
21 talked to is the way it was. 
22 So, as far as the due process argument, number one, 
23 it was not an egregious period of time between the commencement 
24 of the investigation of May of '98 and the filing of the 
25 information in May of '99. The death of this apparent witness 
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1 would have made, if we had jumped in and filed as soon as we 
2 had something, it wouldn't have made any difference because 
3 that witness was already deceased. 
4 Now, finally, the defendant wasn't available for an 
5 interview because he, himself, was no longer in the 
6 jurisdiction. 
7 Going to the second issue, and I confess, I think 
8 that's the more problematic issue before the Court and that's 
9 the speedy trial issue. Mr. Gravis has suggested that Doggett 
10 changed the law as set down in Barker vs. Wingo and the State's 
11 case of State vs. Banks. I didn't arrive at that conclusion 
12 exactly and felt that this Court was still bound to consider 
13 whether there's even a delay so extensive that it triggers the 
14 need for judicial review. And in this case we concede that 
15 there is (inaudible) of delay because it's just over a year, 
16 approximately thirteen to fourteen months between the filing of 
17 the informations and the time we lodge our detainer. I think 
18 that I can say that our not lodging a detainer between June of 
19 *98 and July or August of *99, when the defendant was 
20 discovered in Alabama -
21 MR. GRAVIS: 2000. 
22 MR. PARMLEY: All right, thank you, Mr. Gravis. 
23 Between June of 9^9 and between August of 2000 is simply 
24 negligence, dereliction, whatever. I don't have an explanation 
25 and Mr. Gravis kept bring that up. The State has not offered 
1 problems or ongoing cases or whatever that after one year there 
2 is a presumption that the rights of the defendant have been 
3 violated under the constitution for a speedy trial and that 
4 almost cannot be rebutted unless there are some extenuating 
5 circumstances. 
6 MR. GRAVIS: No, I don't, like I say, it's not my job 
7 to say what extenuating circumstances, the State has the burden 
8 I of showing it and they, quite frankly, they've offered nothing.
 ; 
I 
9 I But - ! 
i 
10 I THE COURT: Let's assume they have nothing. I mean | 
11 there does not, there doesn't appear to be anything except j 
12 J there is negligence. But there doesn't appear to be anything, 
13 I anything out there that I can see that -
14 I MR. GRAVIS: I would submit the Doggett is even, this 
15 case is even better than Doggett given that the time period is 
16 I different because in Doggett they didn't know where the 
17 defendant was and the Court says all you had to do was look and 
18 you would have found him. That's the negligence. In this case 
19 they knew where the defendant was but even before they filed 
20 they knew. So, it was not we don't know where he is. They 
21 knew where he was and they still did nothing. 
22 MR. PARMLEY: And I guess what I'm still not clear 
23 about is that they, see, we know in Banks and all that line of 
24 cases, doesn't talk about this presumption of prejudice that 
25 you're referring to Doggett and I'm not sure that that's the 
19 
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4 COURT CLERK: The State of Utah versus Kelly Garner, 
5 991902255, the (inaudible) for decision on page 9. 
6 THE COURT: Thank you. And Mr. Gravis is appearing. 
7 MR. GRAVIS: Mr. Garner is here, your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Garner is present. Mr. 
9 I Parmley is here for the State. This matter has been briefed. 
10 Subsequent to the briefing there was additional cases that were 
11 j submitted by Mr. Parmley. In addition to that, Mr. Gravis then 
l 
12 j submitted numerous cases to me. I've had a chance to review 
13 all of the material that was submitted to me although it was 
14 lengthy and that was done some time ago, so don't challenge me 
15 on any particular word in a case. I think the, the Doggett 
16 case was the case that was initially raised and I've had an 
17 opportunity to review that and review that with some of the 
18 other cases. And Doggett, of course was, and in the Doggett 
19 case it talks about the necessity of (inaudible) pack, 
20 sensitive case, sensitive in that case there was, as I recall, 
21 about eight and a half years of a delay. 
22 There is a case, the Beman case, and I don't remember 
23 who submitted that to me, whether or not came - but that talks 
24 about the dockets and the delays. In this case, the Court 
25 refers again to the, to what elements have to be met and, 
1 I again, talks about it being very fact sensitive- As I review 
2 I that case I was much more similar to the time elements that 
3 J were involved in this case. I have tried to figure out how to 
4 | deal with the issue that Mr. Gravis raised in that of his, of 
5 J the availability of witnesses and that prejudice, particularly 
6 the Mother who apparently is deceased and would have and could 
7 have testified had the inability of or presented some alibi, 
8 however, I don't have any record of that. I don't have any way 
9 I to determine that other than based upon the representations, I 
10 don't have that, that fact before me. I am, I've looked at 
11 the, I don't think this case falls into the category of 
12 I violation of speedy trial based upon the cases that I have read 
13 J and I deny the motion. 
14 I MR. GRAVIS: Clarify it. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. 
16 MR. GRAVIS: Are you finding the fourteen month or a 
17 twenty month delay? Well, I think the case law I submitted it 
18 I subsequent would say the delay is from the date of the filing 
19 of the information to the trial date not to the time he's 
20 brought, first brought before the court. 
21 THE COURT: I don't, I don't, I'm not, I don't have . 
22 right on the mind, Mr. Gravis, what the -
23 MR. GRAVIS: The information was filed, I believe, on 
24 June 7 -
25 THE COURT: In fact, I have in my mind that it was 
arguments at the time that he lost his parole date and we 
agreed that the facts were not in question. That we had 
stipulated to all the facts including that. 
THE COURT: Okay. Was that, is that a fact? Then 
that goes into the findings of fact. 
MR. PARMLEY: I have not stipulated to that but I 
didn't have any reason to dispute that. I don't know how it 
was that it came to the agency's attention that they lost the 
detainer. Mr. Gravis said that it was as a result of the 
hearing in Alabama. And I don't have any reason to know 
otherwise, your Honor, that could very well be. 
THE COURT: Mr. Parmley, is you'll prepare the 
findings of fact and if you'll look at those, Mr. Gravis, and 
make sure that you have any facts that you want listed in that 
finding of facts so that's preserved. 
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, I don't know, I don't show 
on my file that we have a further pretrial set. 
THE COURT: We don't. 
MR. GRAVIS: It may be beneficial to set a further 
pretrial. Mr. Parmley and I have talked about a possible 
resolution, reserving the right to appeal your decision today. 
THE COURT: Certainly. 
MR. GRAVIS: And I think we'd like, there is some 
things that we need to iron out. 
THE COURT: But the case needs to be resolved. I 
4 
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MR. LAKER: That would be number 7, your, or 19, 
excuse me, your Honor, on page 7. That is Kelly Garner. 
COURT CLERK: Oh, Kelly Garner. 
THE COURT: Number 25? 
COURT CLERK: The State of Utah vs. Kellv Garner, 
991902255, the time set for a pretrial. (Inaudible). 
MR. PARMLEY: He was and I think that I've got this, 
(inaudible) I think we've got it worked out, your Honor. 
COURT CLERK: Okay. 
THE COURT: Mr. Garner is present and Mr. Laker, 
you're appearing here this morning with him? 
MR. LAKER: Yes, I am, your Honor. We have arrived 
at an agreement on it. 
MR. PARMLEY: Well, I can state that if that's all 
right with Mr. Laker. There is a approximately a fifteen count 
information before the Court and the - or a ten count. The 
defendant right now is serving a prison term in Alabama. We 
have him here in Utah to try and come to a final disposition on 
these pending charges. What we've agreed is that the defendant 
would be entering a plea of guilty to four counts of burglary, 
a third degree felony, one, four, eight and six. All of the 
remaining counts would be dismissed. Furthermore, the State 
has agreed that we have information as to some other burglaries 
in Weber County that occurred during this same period of time. 
I believe that Mr. Gravis is aware that those businesses are, 
as referred to in the reports, we're agreeing we're not going 
to pursue any prosecution of any of those other matters. We 
would then move to dismiss all the other pending charges upon 
the defendant's plea of guilty. And we would then further 
recommend that the Court sentence on these charges here in Utah 
be zero to five years, all concurrent with each other and 
concurrent with the terms that the defendant is serving in 
Alabama and what we mean by that that we really do contemplate 
that the defendant, we're not asking Alabama to enlarge or 
lengthen the time the defendant serves in Alabama by virtue of 
our convictions here. We're just asking the commitment can 
just run concurrent with whatever Alabama is doing and we're 
asking that the minute entry or order of commitment reflect 
that that is the negotiation. 
MR. LAKER: With some specificity so that they 
understand that specifically. 
THE COURT: You will be drafting it. 
MR. PARMLEY: That we would be returned to Alabama 
and complete his terms there and then we're stipulating to a 
figure of $10,840 restitution that would become part of his 
parole agreement in Alabama for the victims in our cases here 
in Utah. We've also agreed that the defendant can reserve his 
2 
right to appeal the Court's decision on the speedy trial issues 
that the Court has previously heard. 
Is that the extent of the agreement? 
MR. LAKER: That's the extent of the agreement. I 
think it would behoove us to get some clarification on the 
Court's ruling with regard to the speedy trial issue. 
Specifically what areas the Court found lacking as far as the 
analysis on the Harper vs. Wingle analysis. 
MR. PARMLEY: Well, at this point I think we need to 
forward with the (inaudible). 
THE COURT: If you're going to give what you've got 
there. I mean, I'm not, we've done that -
COURT CLERK: (Inaudible) There is already an order. 
(Inaudible) 
MR. PARMLEY: The Court has asked the State to 
prepare findings (both talking). 
THE COURT: Prepare that and then you'll have a 
chance to review that then you'll have a chance to review that 
and the Court will sign that so you'll have that specific 
order, Mr. Garner, and then you can decide whether or not to 
take that up. 
THE DEFENDANT: Okay, as far as a little bit of 
clarification. I'm not actually still serving my original 
sentence in Alabama. I'm back on a parole violation for a 
trespass charge and because they understood that I was arrested 
3 
1 and 8? Is that, have I got the right numbers? 
2 MR. LAKER: That's correct, your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Garner, are you with us? Is 
4 I that what we're going to do? 
5 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
6 I THE COURT: We're going to preserve your right to 
7 I appeal based upon some findings that is going to be submitted 
8 | by the State. If you want further specificity of the sentence 
9 that the Court is going to impose after this then you'll need 
LO to submit that in writing. Mr. Gravis or Mr. Laker can submit 
.1 I that to the Court. It will need to be approved by the County 
2 I Attorney's office and then I'll take a look at it and sign 
3 ! that, if appropriate, which may assist in anything to do with 
4 ! Alabama. Okay? 
5 ! THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 
6 I THE COURT: All right. Let me go through your rights 
7 with you so that I know that you understand them and that 
} you're entering a plea knowingly and voluntarily. I would 
) I first advise you that you have the right against self 
incrimination. You don't have to say or do anything that will 
incriminate you. That means you do not have to plead guilty to 
these counts. Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: I do. 
THE COURT: You need to understand that you have a 
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COURT CLERK: The State of Utah vs. Kelly Garner, 
991902255. 
THE COURT: This is the time set for sentencing. Mr. 
Gravis? 
MR. GRAVIS: Yes, your Honor. One thing that we'd 
talked about and I wasn't here last time but from what I 
understand the State was going to prepare a written letter and 
Mr. Parmley didn't get the note to send back with Mr. Garner 
explaining their recommendation that he not do any additional 













like I say, didn't get the information and the letter is not 
done so we'd ask to continue this one more week so Mr. Parmley 
can look -
THE COURT: Let me tell you how I think this is going 
to best resolved to follow through with the agreement that has 
been entered into. I think that the, and I based upon this by 
recommendations from the Department of Corrections that I 
impose the prison sentence in Utah; that I run that concurrent 
with the State of Alabama and allow them, impose the 
restitution. Then I understand that Alabama will come and get 
you and that you'll be taken back to Alabama and that would be 
the concurrency. If you're placed on probation with Alabama or 
if you're let out on parole in Alabama, then if you're going to 
come here, you'd be under some kind of a pact but the 
Department of Corrections would retain jurisdiction, now, I 
think meets with the intent is what was attempted to be. 
MR. GRAVIS: That does except for the part that the 
State would also further agreed to Alabama that they not give 
him any additional time. 
MR. PARMLEY: We had agreed that we would send a 
letter to the - and I'm not sure who the person would be. 
Would it be the woman that you and I both talked to, do you 
think? 
MR. GRAVIS: I think she'd be the one, yeah. 
MR. PARMLEY: Probably. We agreed that we would send 
a letter to them letting them know specifically that we weren't 
asking them to extend his time there as a result of our 
convictions here and I was just intending to send a letter 
after he was sentenced. But if they want me to prepare the 
letter so they can see a copy of it, that's fine. 
THE COURT: Well, let's get it done so it starts 
moving. I mean let's get the sentence imposed and let's get 
him down there so Alabama can be notified. The letter can be, 
that's part of the Order. 
MR. GRAVIS: He'll go to prison and then he'll be 
transferred from the prison. That way (inaudible) probation 
department, they can get him to Alabama faster. 
